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INTRODUCTION

There is little doubt that upon learning Brandon Michael Read, a
twenty-one-year-old specialist in the United States Army Reserve 1 from
Greeneville, Tennessee, had been killed in Iraq in September 2004 when an
improvised explosive device blew up near the truck in which he was man* John & Ann Curley Professor of First Amendment Studies and Co-Director of
the Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment at The Pennsylvania State University.
B.A., Communication, Stanford University, 1987; J.D. (Order of the Coif), McGeorge
School of Law, University of the Pacific, 1991; Ph.D., Communication, Stanford University,
1996. Member, State Bar of California. The author thanks Michelle Ly Rochkind for her
thoughtful comments when reviewing drafts of this article.
1. As provided on its official website, the United States Army Reserve's mission
is to provide trained and ready Soldiers and units with the critical combat service support and combat support capabilities necessary to support
nation strategy during peacetime, contingencies and war. The Army Reserve is a key element in The Army multi-component unit force, training
with Active and National Guard units to ensure all three components
work as a fully integrated team.
Army Reserve, Mission Statement, http://www.armyreserve.army.mil/ARWEB/MISSION
(last visited May 13, 2008).
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ning a machine gun,32 his parents suffered emotional pain and anguish over
the loss of their son.
By April 2008, however, more than three-and-a-half years after the
death of their child, the extent of the mental grief and pain sustained by
Michael A. Read and Robin Read, the parents of Brandon Michael Read,
was so severe and profoundly palpable that it had metastasized into the
form of a lawsuit they filed in federal court in Tennessee, seeking $1 million in compensatory damages and $9 million in punitive damages.4 But,
perhaps surprisingly, the target of the couple's collective wrath was neither
the enemy forces that presumably planted the roadside bomb that killed
their son, 5 nor the administration of President George W. Bush under whose
watch, as commander in chief,6 he had died. Rather, the object of their ire
was a peace activist named Dan Frazier from Flagstaff, Arizona, who "sells
shirts emblazoned with the phrase 'Bush Lied, They Died,' 7 along with the
names of thousands of soldiers killed in Iraq. ' 8
2.
The Associated Press reported that Read "was with the 125th Transportation
Company from Lexington, Ky." and "had volunteered for a more dangerous position before
a roadside bomb exploded near his truck" where he was riding as the gunner. Soldier Volunteeredfor Dangerous Position Before Getting Killed, Assoc. PRESS STATE & LOCAL WIRE,
Sept. 11, 2004; see also Honor the Fallen:Army Spc. Brandon M. Read, MILITARY TIMES,
http://www.militarycity.com/valor/347768.html (last visited May 29, 2008) (providing biographical information about Read, as well as details about his death, and describing Read as
"21, of Greeneville, Tenn.; assigned to the 125th Transportation Company, Lexington, Ky.;
killed Sept. 6 when his convoy came under attack by enemy forces using an improvised
explosive device in Qayyarah West, Iraq"); Brandon Michael Read, Iraq/Afghanistan War
Heroes Website, http://www.iraqwarheroes.org/read.htm (last visited May 29, 2008) (providing information about Read, including his death).
3.
Such a reaction seems natural, as reflected by a Los Angeles Times article that
profiled Richard Dvorin, the father of a dead American serviceman who, like Brandon Michael Read, was killed by a roadside bomb in Iraq in 2004. Erika Hayasaki, Column One;
Honor and Dutyfor His Fallen Son; RichardDvorin is Working the Night Shift, Answering a
Hotline for Those Who Have Felt War's Pain-A Pain He Feels Every Day, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 2008, at Al. The article describes the emotional anguish Dvorin still experiences
over the loss of his son, and it quotes Dvorin for the propositions that "I know what other
families are going to go through; I know the sorrow" and "I know probably every parent that
views their child in the casket will say to that child, 'It should have been me and not you."'
Id.
4.
Complaint at 7, Read v. Lifeweaver, L.L.C., No. 2:08-CV- 116 (E.D. Tenn. Apr.
22,
2008),
available
at
http://www.carryabigsticker.com/bltd-docs/TNReadFraziersuit.pdf [hereinafter Complaint].
5.
See supra text accompanying note 2.
6.
The United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he President
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia
of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States." U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
7.
An image of the "Bush Lied" front side of the t-shirt is found on Frazier's website at http://www.carryabigsticker.com/images/bush-liedfront-nov06_big.gif (last visited
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The shirts, which were still available for sale in May 2008 on Frazier's
website, 9 previously had captured the attention of legislative bodies l° in five
states11 that passed laws attempting to regulate and restrict their sale and/or
to provide relatives of the deceased soldiers with civil causes of action
against those who sell the shirts without their permission. 12 Although several other similar measures targeting Frazier's t-shirts were under consideration in 2008,13 the constitutionality of the existing laws limiting the use
May 29, 2008). An image of the "They Died" back side of the t-shirt is found on Frazier's
website at http://www.carryabigsticker.com/images/bush lied-backbig.gif (last visited May
29, 2008).
8.
Christian Palmer, Family of Slain U.S. Soldier Pursues $40 Billion Class-Action
Against Flagstaff T-Shirt Vendor, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES, May 2, 2008, available on LexisNexis Academic.
CarryABigSticker.com, http://www.carryabigsticker.com (last visited May 13,
9.

2008).

For instance, the Arizona legislature in 2007 "passed a law that effectively bans
10.
the use of a dead soldier's name without his or her family's consent in response to complaints from families upset that a Flagstaff-based businessman, Dan Frazier, had been selling
antiwar t-shirts with the names of soldiers who had died in Iraq and Afghanistan." 2007:
Year in Review, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES, Dec. 28, 2007, available on LexisNexis Academic;
see also Paul Davenport, Antiwar T-shirts Face a Battle of Their Own, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
(Norfolk, Va.), May 18, 2007, at A7 (reporting that "incensed by the sale of antiwar t-shirts
and other paraphernalia emblazoned with the names and pictures of America's military dead,
some states are outlawing the commercial use of the fallen without the permission of their
families").
By April 2008, when the Reads filed their lawsuit against Dan Frazier, the states
11.
that had enacted laws targeting the use of the names of dead soldiers included the following:
Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-761, 13-3726 (Supp. 2007); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 540.08(3) (West Supp. 2008); Louisiana, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102.21 (2008); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 839.1A (West Supp. 2008); and Texas, TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 35.64 (Vernon Supp. 2007). See also Mark Lisheron, Antiwar Artists Say Free
Speech Trumps All, AusTIN AM.-STATESMAN (Tex.), July 20, 2007, at Al (writing that
"Texas will be the fifth state, along with Arizona, to outlaw the use of names or images
without permission. Florida, Louisiana and Oklahoma are the others," and calling Dan Frazier "a kind of martyr to the new laws").
See generally Clay Calvert, Support Our [Dead] Troops: Sacrificing Political
12.
Expression Rights for FamilialControl Over Names and Likenesses, 16 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 1169 (2008) (describing and analyzing the Arizona legislation targeting t-shirts and
other objects carrying the names of dead soldiers without permission of their estates and
relatives).
13.
For instance, by the end of April 2008, both the Maryland Senate and House of
Delegates had passed the Fallen Soldier Privacy Act of 2008, a measure providing, in final
amended form and in relevant part, that:
A person may not knowingly use the name, portrait, picture, or image of
a soldier killed in the line of duty within the previous 50 years in advertising for the sale of a product, good, ware, merchandise, or service, for
the purpose of gaining a commercial advantage, without obtaining prior
consent for use from the soldier or the surviving spouse, the personal
representative, or the majority of the heirs of the deceased soldier.
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of the names and likenesses of dead soldiers was constitutionally suspect,
raising First Amendment 4 free speech concerns. In fact, in September
2007, a federal judge in Frazier's home state of Arizona issued a prelimi15
nary injunction
in Frazier
Arizona
statute that
provides,v.inBoomsma,
relevant part:preventing enforcement of an
A person shall not knowingly use the name, portrait or picture of a deceased soldier for the purpose of advertising for
the sale of any goods, wares or merchandise or for the solicitation of patronage for any business without having obtained prior consent to the use by the soldier or by the soldier's spouse, immediate family member, trustee if16the soldier is a minor or legally designated representative.

S.
3,
2008
Reg.
Sess.
(Md.
2008),
available
at
http://mlis.state.md.us/2008rs/billfile/sb0003.htm; H.D. 64, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008),
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2008rs/billfile/sb0003.htm. The Maryland legislation
"was introduced after some Maryland families took offense at an Arizona-based online
retailer selling shirts with slogans like 'Bush Lied, They Died' under the names of more than
3,000 dead soldiers." Political Notes: Fallen Soldier Privacy Act Headedfor Governor's
Desk, MD. GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 2008, at A5. As the Baltimore Sun reported in January 2008,
"[l]awmakers said they filed the bill after hearing from the families of soldiers who were
killed in Iraq and whose names were among thousands featured on t-shirts with the slogans
'Bush Lied' and 'They Died' on the front and back." Laura Smitherman, Ban on Antiwar TShirts Sought, BALT. SUN, Jan. 16, 2008, at 2B.
In addition, Michigan was considering legislation-Senate Bill 983-in 2008
that would "prohibit using an individual's name, image, or identity to make profit without
the individual's permission. The bill resolves a controversy that erupted when fallen American soldiers were featured on materials for commercial gain despite their families' objections." Press Release, Michigan Senator Mark Schauer, Schauer Cosponsors Legislation to
Prevent Exploitation of Fallen Heroes; Initiative Would Stop the Unapproved Use of Soldier's
Names
or
Images
(Dec.
19,
2007),
available
at
http://www.senate.mi.gov/dem/pr.php?id=785; see also S. 983, 94th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2007),
available
at
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/20072008/billintroduced/Senate/pdf/2007-SIB-0983.pdf.
14.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in pertinent
part, that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated more than
eight decades ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state
and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925).
15.
Frazier v. Boomsma, No. CV 07-08040-PHX-NVW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72427, at *55 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2007). In August 2008, U.S. District Court Judge Neil V.
Wake converted the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction prohibiting Arizona
from enforcing Arizona Revised Statute § 13-3726 as applied to Dan Frazier. Frazier v.
Boomsma, No. 07-CV-8040-PHX-NVW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63896 (D. Ariz. Aug. 20,
2008).
16.
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3726 (Supp. 2007).
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But the lawsuit brought by the parents of Brandon Michael Read has nothing to do with any of these laws; importantly, it is a civil suit, sounding in
traditional tort law, which places the t-shirts squarely within the crosshairs
of the grieving family. The case took on greater magnitude on April 29,
2008, just one week after the filing of the complaint, when the plaintiffs
filed an amended complaint seeking class-action status under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for (and requesting a whopping total of
more than $40 billion on behalf of),
the heirs at law, either testate or intestate, of the members
of the United States Armed Forces killed in the service of
their country in the war on terror in Iraq and the Middle
East, from and after September 11, 2001, through date and
continuing, and whose names have or still are being printed
on chattels and17other personal property sold for profit by
the defendants.
According to the original complaint filed on April 22, 2008, Robin
Read first learned in September 2007 that Frazier and his company,
Lifeweaver, L.L.C., "were selling for profit, 'antiwar t-shirts' with names of
all the thousands of American service members killed in Iraq, including
plaintiffs' decedent."1 8 That same month, Robin Read's attorney sent a letter to Frazier that "demanded that defendants provide proof that her son's
name had been removed from their product, and that any further product
defendants, jointly and severally, sold did not contain the name of plaintiffs' decedent." 1 9 The complaint then averred that neither Read nor her
attorney received any response from Frazier.2 °
The Reads claimed that the continued inclusion of the name of their
late son, Brandon Michael Read, on an antiwar t-shirt, following the failure
to remove it after having asked Dan Frazier do so, gave rise, under Tennessee law, to tort causes of action for both intentional infliction of emotional
distress 2'--often abbreviated by courts simply as IIED 22-and outrageous

17.
Amendment to Complaint at 2, Read v. Lifeweaver, L.L.C., No. 2:08-CV-116
(E.D. Tenn. Apr. 29, 2008) [hereinafter Amendment to Complaint].
18.
Complaint, supra note 4, at 2.
19.
Complaint, supra note 4, at 3.
20.
Complaint, supra note 4, at 3.
21.
See generally Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 359, 394-99
(2008) (discussing the history and evolution of the cause of action of intentional infliction of
emotional distress).
22.
See, e.g., Breneisen v. Motorola, Inc., 512 F.3d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 2008), reh'g
denied, No. 05-2032, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 4533, at * 1 (7th Cir. Feb. 20, 2008) (referring
to intentional infliction of emotional distress by that tort's initials, IIED); Feirson v. District

56
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conduct.23 Although the complaint identified and pleaded these as separate
theories, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that they are, in fact, the
same cause of action.24 The gist and gravamen of the plaintiffs' claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, as stated in the complaint, boils
down to this grievance and assertion:
A reasonable, prudent person.., would look at defendants'
actions in utilizing (a) the name and/or likeness of the late
Brandon Michael Read, a fallen soldier, and (b) continuing
to use that likeness after a request was made to cease and
desist, both for profit, and2 would
scream at the top of their
5
outrageous!
"that's
lungs,
The plaintiffs' pleading of "that's outrageous!" reflects a comment in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts which states that liability for intentional
infliction of emotional distress generally only exists in those cases "in
which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community
would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim,
'Outrageous!"' 26 The Supreme Court of Tennessee, the state in which the
Reads' lawsuit was filed, has cited and recognized the admonition in the
Restatement with approval.27

of Columbia, 506 F.3d 1063, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (referring to intentional infliction of
emotional distress by the tort's initials, lIED).
23.
Complaint, supra note 4, at 5-6.
24.
See Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 n.3 (Tenn. 1997) (writing that
"[i]ntentional infliction of emotional distress and outrageous conduct are not two separate
torts, but are simply different names for the same cause of action").
25.
Complaint, supra note 4, at 6.
26.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).
27.
In Medlin v. Allied Investment Co., 398 S.W.2d 270 (Tenn. 1966), the Supreme
Court of Tennessee cited comment d to section 46 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and
held that:
From the foregoing portion of the Restatement, we find the two factors
which must concur in order to outweigh the policy against allowing an
action for the infliction of mental disturbance: (a) the conduct complained of must have been outrageous, not tolerated in civilized society,
and (b) as a result of the outrageous conduct, there must be serious mental injury. Stated another way, there are two valid policies fighting for
recognition; the interest in a judicial climate which does not become
burdened with trivial lawsuits versus the interest a person has in being
free from unreasonable emotional disturbance.
Medlin v. Allied Inv. Co., 398 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Tenn. 1966) (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965)).
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Although it is not the first lawsuit for lIED stemming from or relating
to speech and the death of American soldiers in Iraq,28 the Reads' cause of
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, based upon the failure
of Dan Frazier to remove their late son's name from the antiwar t-shirts he
sells, raises two new questions of constitutional importance addressed in
this article:
1. Should the same level of constitutional protection extended in
1988 by the United States Supreme Court in Hustler Magazine v.
Falwel 29 to defendants in intentional infliction of emotional distress cases brought by public figures and public officials who
claim that speech causes them severe emotional distress be similarly applied to cases brought by private-figure plaintiffs when the
speech at issue is both political and centers on a matter of public
concern?
2. If such constitutional protection adopted in Falwell is, indeed, extended to defendants in intentional infliction of emotional distress
cases brought by private-figure plaintiffs when the allegedly harmful speech is political and centers on a matter of public concern,
then would the plaintiffs, Robin and Michael Read, in Read v.
Lifeweaver be allowed to prevail in their lawsuit against Dan Frazier?
Part II of this article analyzes and addresses the first of these two research questions, providing in the process an overview of both the common-law elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the
High Court's Falwell decision, as well as a review of the importance of
protecting political speech, no matter how offensive it may be, as recognized by the United States Supreme Court.30 In addition, Part II examines
how the Supreme Court has used the concept of speech about matters of
public concern in First Amendment jurisprudence, and thus should have
little problem borrowing it to apply it to intentional infliction of emotional
28.
For instance, in February 2008, U.S. District Court Judge Richard D. Bennett
upheld a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from protests by members of the Westboro Baptist Church outside
of the funeral for a Marine killed in Iraq. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md.
2008). The plaintiff in that case was the father of the deceased Marine, and the protestors
carried signs with homophobic messages such as 'Thank God for dead soldiers" and "Semper fi fags." Id. at 569-70. Judge Bennett found that "there was sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to return a verdict on Plaintiffs claims for intrusion upon seclusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil conspiracy." Id. at 584. Although the judge
reduced the amount of punitive damages meted out by the jury, he nonetheless "found that
the jury's award for $2.9 million in compensatory damages does not shock the conscience
and must be upheld." Id. at 589.
29.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
30.
See infra notes 37-97 and accompanying text.
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distress cases. 31 Part III then addresses the second research question, analyzing the probability of success of the Reads under their lIED cause of
action, and it ultimately concludes that the 32Reads would-and, indeed,
should-lose their lawsuit against Dan Frazier.
Finally, Part IV concludes by calling on families like the Reads that
are, perhaps rightfully, upset by the use of their children's names on antiwar
products to fight their battles in the court of public opinion, rather than in
courts of law. 33 The better remedy than lawsuits, the conclusion proposes,
for the Reads and their ilk is to engage in the age-old activity of counterspeech. 34 In particular, they may create their own t-shirts listing the names
of deceased soldiers, and inscribe them with the decidedly different and
contrasting message, "They Died As Heroes," and wear them with pride as
active participants in the metaphorical marketplace of ideas. 35 As the late
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wrote more than eighty years ago,
"[ijf there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies,
to avert the evil by the processes of36education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence."

II.

EXTENDING CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS AGAINST
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CLAIMS BROUGHT
BY PRIVATE-FIGURE PLAINTIFFS AND TARGETING POLITICAL

EXPRESSION

Although IIED is, as Professor Martha Chamallas recently wrote, a
relatively new legal theory, it "is now well enough established to consider it
a permanent fixture of the common law of torts." 37 In fact, it is so well so31.

See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.

32.
See infra notes 98-130 and accompanying text.
33.
See infra notes 131-136 and accompanying text.
34.
See generally Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Counterspeech2000: A New
Look at the Old Remedy for "Bad" Speech, 2000 BYU L. REv. 553 (2000) (analyzing the
counterspeech doctrine and providing examples of its use).
35.
The marketplace of ideas theory holds that citizens should "be able to see and
hear all ideas-the good, the bad and the indifferent-and be able to determine for themselves what is good and righteous." ROBERT TRAGER & DONNA L. DICKERSON, FREEDOM OF
ExPREssION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 102 (1999). As constitutional-law scholar and current
Dean of Washington and Lee University School of Law, Rodney A. Smolla, writes, "the
marketplace of ideas is, perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the free speech tradition."
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992). See generally MATTHEW D.
BUNKER, CRITIQUING FREE SPEECH 2-8 (2001) (describing the marketplace of ideas theory,
including its origins and goals, as well as criticisms of it).
36.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
37.
Martha Chamallas, Discrimination and Outrage: The Migration from Civil
Rights to Tort Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 2115, 2117 (2007).
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lidified that in a 2007 law journal article examining and surveying the state
of the lED tort, Professor John J. Kircher of Marquette University Law
School observed that "[a]ll states have recognized intentional infliction of
emotional distress as an independent tort and have adopted Restatement
(Second) of Torts section 46 in some form. 38 That section provides that
"[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly
causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such
emotional distress,
39
bodily harm."
In order to prevail in a typical intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action, a plaintiff generally must prove four basic elements:
(1) extreme and outrageous conduct engaged in by the defendant, (2) the
conduct was engaged in by the defendant either with the intent of causing
the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress or with recklessness as to whether
the plaintiff would suffer emotional distress, (3) causation of harm to the
plaintiff resulting from the defendant's conduct, and (4) severe emotional
distress suffered by the plaintiff.40 Some states, including Tennessee where
the Reads filed their lawsuit against Dan Frazier, have boiled these four
elements down to three. In particular, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
wrote in 1997 that "there are three essential elements to a cause of action:
(1) the conduct complained of must be intentional or reckless; (2) the con-

38.

John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liabilityfor Emotional Harm, 90

MARQ.L. REv. 789, 806 (2007).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
For instance, a federal district court recently observed:
Under California law, a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof of the following elements: (1) extreme and
outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) with the intention of causing,
or reckless disregard for the probability of causing, emotional distress;
(3) the plaintiff suffers severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) defendant's outrageous conduct actually and proximately caused the emotional distress.
Mitan v. Feeney, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2007).
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Idaho recently recognized that:
In Idaho, four elements are necessary to establish a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress: (1) the conduct must be intentional or
reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) there must
be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional
distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe.
Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733, 740 (Idaho 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S.
1184 (2004); see also Chamallas, supra note 37, at 2125 (writing that "[t]he influential section 46 of the Second Restatement of Torts required only four elements of proof to establish
a claim: (1) intent or recklessness, (2) extreme and outrageous conduct, (3) causation, and
(4) severe emotional distress").
39.
40.
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duct must be so outrageous that it is not tolerated by civilized society;
and
41
(3) the conduct complained of must result in serious mental injury.
In 1988, the United States Supreme Court added a constitutional dimension to the lIED tort in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.42 That case pivoted on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim filed by the late
moral-majority leader Jerry Falwel1 43 against Hustler Magazine and its publisher, Larry Flynt, based upon an ad parody that appeared in the November
1983 issue of Hustler which suggested Falwell had sex with his mother in
an outhouse and preached while he was drunk."a In ruling in favor of Hustler and Flynt, the Supreme Court held
that public figures and public officials may not recover for
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress by
reason of publications such as the one here at issue without
showing in addition that the publication contains a false
statement of fact which was made with "actual malice,"
i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.45
Under this new constitutional hurdle, Jerry Falwell lost his case for lIED
because, as Professor Nicholas Wolfson observed, "there was no false
41.
Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997).
42.
485 U.S. 46 (1988).
43.
Falwell, who died in May 2007, was described upon his death as one who had
been transformed
from a Baptist preacher in Lynchburg to a powerful force in electoral
politics, at home in both the millennial world of fundamentalist Christianity and the earthly blood sport of the political arena. As much as anyone, he helped create the religious right as a political force, defined the
issues that would energize it for decades and cemented its ties to the Republican Party.
Peter Applebome, JerryFalwell, Moral Majority Founder,Dies at 73, N.Y. TIMES, May 16,
2007, at Al.
In addition, Falwell
was a lightning rod for controversy and caricature. After the Sept. 11 attacks, for example, he apologized for calling Muhammad a terrorist and
for suggesting that the attacks had reflected God's judgment on a nation
spiritually weakened by the American Civil Liberties Union, providers
of abortion and supporters of gay rights. He was ridiculed for an article
in his National Liberty Journalsuggesting that Tinky Winky, a character
in the "Teletubbies" children's show, could be a hidden homosexual signal because the character was purple, had a triangle on his head and carried a handbag.
Id.
44. Hustler Magazine, 485 U.S. at 48.
45.
Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
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statement
of fact since the story was an obvious satire, not a statement of
46
fact.
In requiring public officials and public figures to prove an additional
element in speech-based ILED claims, the High Court reasoned that the
heightened burden of actual malice "reflects our considered judgment that
such a standard is necessary to give adequate 'breathing space' to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment. ' ' 47 The importance of this breathing space was clear to Larry Flynt, who stated in a December 2000 interview for a law journal article that "[i]f the First Amendment gives you any
right, it gives you the right to be offensive. Just because somebody may
have been offended by a Falwell parody doesn't give them the right to suppress it."' 48 More recently, Flynt wrote in a commentary for the Los Angeles
Times that had Falwell been allowed to prevail-he had won on his lIED
claim at both the trial court level and before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 4 9-then "no one would ever have to prove
something was false and libelous to win a judgment. All anyone would
have to prove is that 'he upset me' or 'she made me feel bad.' The lawsuits
would be endless, and that would be the end of free speech."50
From a much more scholarly perspective, Professor David Kohler of
Southwestern Law School observed in a recent law journal article that, under the Supreme Court's ruling in Falwell, "the unrestrained application of
a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress to a magazine was held to be incompatible with the First Amendment because its
relatively broad and undefined boundaries might permit the punishment of
unpopular or controversial views., 51 But the High Court in Falwell only
considered whether constitutional protection should be applied when the
plaintiff was either a public official or a public figure; it failed to consider
whether the limitations on lIED recovery that apply to public-figure and
public-official plaintiffs would similarly apply to private-figure plaintiffs
46.
Nicholas Wolfson, Free Speech Theory and Hateful Words, 60 U. CIN. L. REv.
1, 22 (1991).
47.
HustlerMagazine, 485 U.S. at 56.
48.
Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Larry Flynt Uncensored: A Dialogue with
the Most Controversial Figure in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 9 CoMMLAw
CONSPECTUS

159, 164 (2001).

49.
Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 485 U.S. 46 (1988) (affirming the jury award of $100,000 in actual damages, $50,000 in punitive damages against
Flynt and $50,000 in punitive damages against Hustler based on Falwell's cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
50.
Larry Flynt, The Porn King and the Preacher; How I Found Myself in Jerry
Falwell'sEmbrace, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2007, at M1.
51.
David Kohler, Reclaiming the First Amendment: Constitutional Theories of
Media Reform: Self Help, the Media and the First Amendment, 35 HoFsTRA L. REv. 1263,
1293-94 (2007).
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when the matter in question involves a matter of public concern. Professor
Robert Post has observed in the HarvardLaw Review that the Falwell opinion "tells us almost nothing about whether the Constitution protects outrageous communications that are disseminated rather than displayed in the
pages of a nationally distributed magazine, or whether it protects outrageous communications that are designed to hurt or embarrass private figures." 52 Post emphasized in that same article that "Falwell is drafted quite
narrowly and holds only that nonfactual ridicule is constitutionally privileged from the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress if the plaintiff is a public figure or public official, and if the ridicule occurs in 'publications such as the one here at issue.' 53 And as Professor Joseph H. King,
Jr. noted in a recent law journal article, the High Court in Falwell "articulated its holding without mentioning a 'matter
of pubic concern' precondi54
tion to constitutional limitations on liability.
Viewed in this light then, it is clear that the narrow holding of the Supreme Court in Falwell does not support its application to the facts of Read
v. Lifeweaver. Why? First, the parents of Brandon Michael Read are neither
public officials nor public figures, and thus, the constitutional safeguard of
actual malice 55 that the Supreme Court held would protect Larry Flynt and
Hustler against public-figure Jerry Falwell's suit for IED would not apply
to similarly shield Dan Frazier from liability. Second, on its facts, Falwell
involved a message published by a mass-media outlet-a magazine-while
Read involves dissemination of an allegedly offensive message through a
very different medium: a t-shirt. Third, the message at issue in Falwell was
one of parody (it was twice labeled as such in Hustler56), while the message
52.
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous
Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV.
603,615 (1990).
53.
Id. at 662 (quoting Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
54. Joseph H. King, Jr., Deus ex Machina and the Unfulfilled Promise of New York
Times v. Sullivan: Applying the Times for All Seasons, 95 KY. L.J. 649, 700 n.271 (20062007).
55. The United States Supreme Court has defined actual malice as the publication of
a statement "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not." N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). The actual malice is
applicable in defamation cases to lawsuits brought by both public officials and public figures. See Harte-Hanks Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 666 (1989) (writing
that "[t]oday, there is no question that public figure libel cases are controlled by the New
York Times standard and not by the professional standards rule"). See generally DON R.
PEMBER & CLAY CALVERT, MASS MEDIA LAW 2009/2010, 188-98 (2008) (discussing actual
malice, its meaning, and its application in defamation lawsuits).
56. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988) (writing that, in the published issue of Hustler in question, "[i]n
small print at the bottom of the page, the ad contains the disclaimer, 'ad parody-not to be taken seriously.' The magazine's table of contents also lists the ad as 'Fiction; Ad and Personality Parody.').
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at issue in Read is in no way intended as parody, but instead relates to political sloganeering and opinion about whether or not President Bush lied
about the presence, or lack thereof, of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq,
and, in turn, whether Bush's alleged lie caused the deaths of U.S. soldiers in
that country.57
Although the Supreme Court's holding in Falwell thus does not
squarely apply to Read, the issue becomes whether the same protection
Falwell affords to defendants in IED cases brought by public figures and
public officials should nonetheless similarly be applied to cases brought by
private-figure plaintiffs when the speech at issue is both political and centers on a matter of public concern. More specifically and put more bluntly
and provocatively, as it affects Read v. Lifeweaver, the question is: Should
the same safeguards granted to pornographerLarry Flynt be given to politicalactivist Dan Frazier?
A strong argument can be made that the protections should indeed apply in Read and, by extension, to similar cases in which the speech at issue
is both political and relates to a matter of public concern. The argument is
best understood when broken down into its component parts.
A.

BOTH FALWELL AND READ CENTER ON HARM ALLEGEDLY CAUSED BY
SPEECH

First, as a threshold matter, both Falwell and Read involve lIED
claims that arose from speech. The emotional distress in Falwell was
caused by a parody of a printed advertisement, 58 while the emotional distress in Read was allegedly caused by the failure to remove printed
speech-the typed name of Brandon Michael Read-from a t-shirt that
includes thousands of other printed words-the names of deceased soldiers-as well as the politically potent messages "Bush Lied" and "They
Died," which lay on top of those names. Brandon Michael Read's name is,
in brief, an integral speech component here-a name that is inextricably
intertwined with the political message of the t-shirt-as it adds reality and
gravitas by connecting the real name of a real person to the death that purportedly resulted when, at least in Dan Frazier's opinion, "Bush Lied." The
removal of his name-the injunctive action and relief requested by Read's
57.
On his website, when one clicks on the "What do you mean, Bush Lied" link,
Frazier states that "Bush is most famous for lying about the weapons of mass destruction in
Iraq. It was this lie that arguably was most responsible for the deaths of thousands of U.S.
soldiers in Iraq, not to mention tens of thousands of innocent Iraqi civilians." CarryABigSticker.com, http://www.carryabigsticker.com (last visited Aug. 26, 2008). In a 2007 newspaper article, Frazier elaborated on the intended meaning of the message on the t-shirts,
stating "the shirt doesn't say these people opposed the war. Just that they died." Nicholas
Riccardi, Column One; The Sting is in the Small Type, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2007, at Al.
58.
HustlerMagazine, 485 U.S. at 48.
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parents 59-lessens the overall impact of the shirt's message. This fact is
brought into high relief and made much more clear when one considers the
amended complaint seeking class-action status on behalf of all of the families of the dead; 6° if every deceased soldier's name was to be removed from*
the t-shirt, then the message "They Died" would lose all meaning, as there
would be no "They" left on the t-shirt to which "Died" refers. The message
"They Died," in brief, is rendered nonsensical unless there are names on the
t-shirt which represent and constitute "They."
United States District Court Judge Neil V. Wake understood the importance, to the overall antiwar message, of including the name of each and
every deceased soldier on the "Bush Lied" t-shirts. In his opinion in Frazier
v. Boomsma61 enjoining Arizona's criminal statute targeting Dan Frazier's
t-shirts, Judge Wake wrote:
Because a focal point of Frazier's critique of the Iraq war is
the magnitude of the personal loss that it has produced, the
individual identities of the deceased American soldiers are
not only reasonably related to his message, but integral to
it. The t-shirts, like the Vietnam War Memorial, derive
some of their communicative force from their ability to
personalize human loss on a great scale. Without the large
number of real names of fallen soldiers, the effect of Frazier's political message would be diminished.62
One can argue, of course, that the Read case is only about conduct-in
particular, the failure of Dan Frazier to engage in the specific requested
conduct of removing Brandon Michael Read's name from t-shirts-and not
about speech. Acceptance of this line of reasoning would, in turn, militate
against any First Amendment speech protection for Dan Frazier. But this
argument is specious because the very object requested for removal is itself
speech: the printed name of Brandon Michael Read. What is more, the object from which its removal is requested is a speech product: a t-shirt containing a political message. Finally, the direct effect of the requested conduct is to diminish the power of the speech: the overall antiwar, anti-Bush
message of Dan Frazier.
59.
See Complaint, supra note 4, at 7 (requesting, in addition to monetary damages,
that "this Court... issue a permanent injunction inhibiting and restraining the defendants,
their attorneys and agents, under the penalty prescribed by law, from continued use of the
name and likeness of their late son").
60.
See Amendment to Complaint, supra note 17, at 2 (identifying the class of individuals on which the plaintiffs are seeking class-action status).
61.
No. CV 07-08040-PHX-NVW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72427 (D. Ariz. Sept.
27, 2007).
62.
Id. at *43.
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THE MEDIUM DOES NOT MAKE A DIFFERENCE

Second, although the High Court in Falwell did not consider speech
appearing on a t-shirt, this should not affect whether or not the underlying
reasoning in that case supports application of its constitutional standards to
Read. Put differently, the medium on which speech is conveyed should not
make a difference. The Supreme Court has protected offensive political
speech on clothing in the past, as it did when protecting a man's right to
wear a jacket carrying the message "Fuck the Draft" in Cohen v. California.63 More recently, the California Supreme Court, in concluding that the
scope of First Amendment protection for artist Gary Saderup was not affected by the fact that his work appeared on t-shirts, wrote that "First
Amendment doctrine does not disfavor nontraditional media of expression." 64 In fact, political expression on t-shirts was even protected recently
in the realm of public high schools, 65 a venue where speech rights can be
restricted more easily than in nonschool settings. 66 In summary, the fact that
the speech in Read appears in a very different medium from the speech in
Falwell should not make a difference in terms of the scope of First
Amendment protection the underlying substantive message receives.
C.

THE POLICY BEHIND FALWELL SUPPORTS ITS EXTENSION TO READ
BECAUSE THE SPEECH AT ISSUE IN READ IS A MATTER OF PUBLIC
CONCERN

Third, it is important to emphasize that a central part of the underlying
theory and rationale behind protecting the expression at issue in Falwell
justifies protecting the expression in Read. In particular, the nation's High
Court in Falwell began its justification of protecting the speech of Larry
Flynt and Hustler by asserting that "[a]t the heart of the First Amendment is
the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and
opinions on matters of public interest and concern. 67 In addition, the Supreme Court emphasized that "robust political debate [is] encouraged by the
63.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
64. Comedy III Prods. v. Saderup, 21 P.3d 797, 804 (Cal. 2001).
65.
Barber v. Dearborn Pub. Sch., 286 F. Supp. 2d 847 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (protecting the right of Bretton Barber, a student at Dearborn High School in Michigan, to wear to
school a t-shirt that displayed a photograph of President George W. Bush with the caption
"International Terrorist").
66. See Morse v. Frederick, No. 06-278, slip op. at 9-10 (U.S. June 25, 2007) (citing
with approval the case of Bethel School District v. Fraser,478 U.S. 675 (1986), for the
proposition that the rights of students in public school settings are not as broad as those of
adults in nonschool venues, and noting that the student speech at issue in Fraser,although
not protected in a school setting, would have been protected "in a public forum outside the
school context").
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
67.
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First Amendment." 68 Writing the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist added that the High Court has "been particularly vigilant
to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed sanctions. The First Amendment recognizes no such thing as
a 'false' idea." 69 The latter reference in Falwell was to the Supreme Court's
decision in the defamation case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,70 in which it
wrote:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a
false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we
depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges
and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But
there
71
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Taken as a whole, the language above regarding the importance of
protecting the free flow of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest
and concern supports extending constitutional protection in Read to Dan
Frazier. While there certainly is substantial legal debate on precisely what
constitutes a matter of public concern in First Amendment jurisprudence, 2
there can be little doubt that American military involvement in Iraq is a
matter of public concern under the U.S. Supreme Court's 2004 observation
that "public concern is something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication. 7 3 Indeed, U.S. District Court Judge Neil V.
Wake, in issuing a preliminary injunction in September 2007 stopping enforcement of Arizona's criminal statute targeting the unauthorized inclusion
of the names of deceased soldiers on goods and merchandise, 74 wrote that:
Frazier'st-shirts constitute core political speech ....

Mes-

sages such as "Bush Lied -- They Died" obviously critique
the initiation and administration of the war in Iraq, perhaps
the most salient and hotly debated issue in current American politics. The record, moreover, makes clear that Frazier
is at least substantially motivated by political considera68.
Id. at51.
69.
Id.
70.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
71.
Id. at 339-40.
72.
See generally Robert E. Drechsel, Defining "Public Concern" in Defamation
Cases Since Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1990) (providing a comprehensive examination of the meaning of the term "public concern" in defamation
law).
73.
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004).
74.
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3726 (2007).
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tions in creating and selling the t-shirts. He is a long-time
peace activist and opponent of the current war who donates
a portion of his proceeds to an organization that provides
support to the families of fallen soldiers. The mere fact that
Frazier sells the t-shirts does not transform them into lessprotected commercial speech.75
More recently, the war in Iraq was an important issue and major
source of contention in the presidential campaign of 2008. 76 For instance, a
survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press in
February 2008 reflected how closely correlated the status of the war in Iraq
was with support for then-presumptive Republican presidential candidate,
Senator John McCain.77 In particular, the survey found that:
Perceptions of how things are going in Iraq are strongly
correlated with support for McCain, among Republicans,
Democrats and independents. For example, in a matchup
against Barack Obama, McCain does 31 points better
among independents who believe the war is going well
than among those who think it is not going well.78
In April 2008, the Pew Research Center reported that, since the start of
2008, public "interest in the war has been fairly stable, with between 25%
and 31% paying very close attention on a weekly basis. 79 In May 2008, the
Washington Times described the results of a Rasmussen Reports survey of
75.
Frazier v. Boomsma, No. CV 07-08040-PHX-NVW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72427, *33 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2007) (emphasis added) (citing Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc'y v.
City of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 1991)). In August 2008, U.S. District
Court Judge Neil V. Wake converted the preliminary injunction into a permanent injunction
prohibiting Arizona from enforcing Arizona Revised Statute § 13-3726 as applied to Dan
Frazier. Frazier v. Boomsma, No. 07-CV-8040-PHX-NVW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63896
(D. Ariz. Aug. 20, 2008).
76.
See generally Stephen Dinan & Christina Bellantoni, McCain, Obama Spar on
Iraq; Fight Previews General Election, WASH. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 2008, at Al ("In a sneak
preview of the ground that both men would defend if they face each other in the presidential
election, John McCain yesterday accused Sen. Barack Obama of misreading the war in Iraq
and Mr. Obama accused the Arizona senator of getting it wrong in the first place .... The
war remains unpopular in opinion polls, and Mr. McCain is fond of saying he risked his
political career in the Republican primary by embracing Mr. Bush's troop surge.").
77.
PEw RESEARCH CTR.FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS, OBAMA HAS THE LEAD, BUT
POTENTIAL PROBLEMS Too (2008), http://people-press.org/report/398/obama-has-the-lead-

but-potential-problems-too.
78.
Id.
79.
Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Campaign News Interest Dips;
Awareness of U.S. Fatalities Rebounds, PEw RESEARCH CTR., Apr. 10, 2008,
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/794/campaign-news-interest-dips.
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800 voters conducted that same month which found that 19% of Republicans surveyed picked the war in Iraq as the most important voting issue,
while, among all voters questioned, more than 25% named Iraq as the top
* 80
issue.
There is little doubt then, that the speech product on which the name
of Brandon Michael Read is incorporated and that is at the center of the
Reads' cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress centers on a political message of public concern.
Importantly, whether or not President Bush actually "lied"-whether
that particular accusation on the t-shirts is an assertion of fact by Frazier or
whether it is more akin to rhetorical hyperbole bandied about in the context
of a heated political debate about a controversial war 81-is not pivotal to
determining whether Dan Frazier's speech merits First Amendment protection against the Reads' lawsuit under the reasoning in Falwell. Why? First,
all of the words on the t-shirts ("Bush Lied" + "They Died" + Names of
Deceased Soldiers) must be considered as a whole, 82 and it is the overall
antiwar message on the t-shirts that represents Frazier's protected opinion-his "idea," as the Supreme Court in Gertz would put it 83-that the war
in Iraq is wrong. In a July 2007 affidavit filed in his lawsuit challenging
Arizona's civil and criminal statutes targeting his t-shirts, Dan Frazier made
it clear that the intended meaning 84 conveyed by the t-shirts to which the
Reads object is decidedly antiwar. In Frazier's own words:
80. Jennifer Harper, Nation; Inside Politics, WASH. TIMES, May 22, 2008, at A5.
81.
See generally Martin F. Hansen, Fact, Opinion, and Consensus: The Verifiability of Allegedly Defamatory Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 43 (1993) (analyzing and critiquing the fact-opinion dichotomy in libel law); John Bruce Lewis & Gregory V. Mersol,
Opinion and RhetoricalHyperbole in Workplace Defamation Actions: The Continuing Quest
for Meaningful Standards, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 19 (2002) (discussing the fact-opinion dichotomy in defamation law).
82.
It is well established that, in defamation law, the meaning of a message must be
determined "[c]onsidering the challenged statements in the context of the entire publication,
their tone and apparent purpose, as well as their effect on the average reader." Armstrong v.
Simon & Schuster, 610 N.Y.S.2d 503 (App. Div. 1994) (emphasis added). In the case of Dan
Frazier, a t-shirt represents "the entire publication," and all of its words must be considered
together. See id. at 506.
83.
418 U.S. 323 (1974).
84.
In defamation law-the area of law from which the United States Supreme
Court borrowed the actual malice standard to apply to lIED lawsuits based on speech claims
in HustlerMagazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988)-it is the intent of the defendant that is
important in determining the meaning of a message. As Professor Joseph H. King, Jr. wrote
in a relatively recent law journal article:
The "meaning" of a communication entails a searchfor what the communicatorintended to convey. The meaning of a statement has been defined by the Restatement as being either the meaning that was correctly
understood as actually intended or reasonably believed to have been intended by the defendant. Stated another way, the meaning is the message
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Among the items for sale on my website are t-shirts that
contain a variety of antiwar messages. One of those t-shirts
contains the words "BUSH LIED -- THEY DIED." The
statement "BUSH LIED" is printed on the front of the tshirt and the statement "THEY DIED" is printed on the
back of the t-shirt in large capital and bold letters. The antiwar message "BUSH LIED -- THEY DIED" is printed
over a background of the names of more than 3,400 American soldiers who have died in the Iraq war since March 20,
2003.85
What is more, just as the Campari liqueur ad parody at issue in Falwell
was found to have made no factual assertions about the plaintiff, Jerry Falwell, 86 Dan Frazier's antiwar t-shirts at issue in Read clearly make no factual assertions about the plaintiffs, Robin Read and Michael Read. The
grieving couple is neither explicitly named nor impliedly referred to on the
t-shirts. Thus, there can be no plausible argument that Dan Frazier was conveying or otherwise communicating a false assertion of fact, with his antiwar t-shirts, concerning the plaintiffs. Rather, Dan Frazier's t-shirts are
making a somewhat dramatic assertion about a government policy-in particular, the decision and subsequent course of action by the Bush administration to engage in a military conflict in Iraq.
Viewed in this light, Frazier's t-shirts are tantamount to the protected
political opinion of Paul Robert Cohen, who objected to another controversial government policy: conscription. In Cohen v. California,87 the nation's
High Court protected Cohen's First Amendment right to peacefully wear a
jacket emblazoned with the message "Fuck the Draft" in a California courthouse.88 Paul Robert Cohen testified in his defense that he wore the jacket
as a "means of informing the public of the depth of his feelings against the
Vietnam War and the draft., 89 The comparison then is clear:
that the defendant actually desired to impart or that the recipient reasonably understood that the defendant intended to express.
Joseph H. King, Jr., Defining the Internal Context for Communications ContainingAllegedly
Defamatory Headline Language, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 863, 872 (2003) (emphasis added).
85.
Affidavit of Plaintiff, Dan Frazier, in Support of Application for Preliminary
Injunction and Expedited Hearing at 2, Frazier v. Boomsma, No. 07-CV-8040-PCT-NVW
(D. Ariz. July 19, 2007) (emphasis added).
86.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). The U.S. Supreme Court in
Falwell accepted the findings of the lower courts that the ad parody could not "reasonably be
understood as describing actual facts" about Jerry Faiwell. Id. at 57 (quotation marks omitted).
87.
403 U.S. 15 (1971).
88.
Id. at 26.
89.
Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
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• Cohen's jacket protest against the war in Vietnam
• Frazier's t-shirts protest against the war in Iraq
In protecting Cohen's expression, the Supreme Court emphasized that
Cohen's underlying message cannot, constitutionally, be the source of punishment:
[T]he State certainly lacks power to punish Cohen for the
underlying content of the message the inscription conveyed. At least so long as there is no showing of an intent
to incite disobedience to or disruption of the draft, Cohen
could not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, be punished for asserting the evident position on the inutility or immorality of the draft his jacket reflected. 90
Similarly, the State of Tennessee would be using its power-under its laws
of intentional infliction of emotional distress-were it to allow for the punishment of Dan Frazier based on his position on the inutility or immorality
of the war in Iraq his t-shirts reflect. Such a use of state law, even in a civil
lawsuit arising under common-law principles, is sufficient to raise the First
Amendment guarantee of
free speech that extends to the States under the
91
Fourteenth Amendment.
What is more, to the extent that the Reads claim that their intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim does not target the underlying antiwar
message on the t-shirts, but rather pivots on the offensiveness of continuing
to include the name of a dead soldier after that soldier's parents directly
requested its removal, then the Court's recognition in Cohen of the problems with what it called the "inherently boundless" 92 concept of offensiveness militates in favor of protecting Dan Frazier's t-shirts. In supporting its
decision in favor of protecting the offensive expression of Hustler and
Larry Flynt, the Supreme Court in Falwell cited favorably its language from

90.
Id. at 18.
91.
For instance, in the libel case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), that centered on Alabama state law, the United States Supreme Court wrote:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose
invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of speech and press.
It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is
common law only, though supplemented by statute. ...The test is not
the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form,
whether such power has in fact been exercised.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
92.
Cohen. 403 U.S. at 25.
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the 1978 opinion in FCCv. Pacifica Foundation93 that "the fact that society
may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it."' 94 In
other words, the offensiveness of the speech-a t-shirt that continues to
include the name of Brandon Michael Read after (and in the face of) a direct request to remove it-is not a sufficient reason for punishing it. The
Supreme Court has made it clear that government power cannot be used to
stop speech simply because it is offensive, 95 which is precisely what Tennessee would be doing were it to allow its laws of intentional infliction of
emotional distress to punish Dan Frazier.
Frazier certainly could make and convey his antiwar statement in a
much more neutral, detached, and disinterested manner. In particular, he
could print t-shirts devoid of the names of any deceased soldiers that read:
"I object to the war in Iraq." This message surely is less controversial and
confrontational than the one at the heart of the Reads' lawsuit. But, as the
Supreme Court wrote in Cohen, the First Amendment protects not only
what is said but, importantly, how something is said:
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative
function: it conveys not only ideas capable of relatively
precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much
for their emotive as their cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function which practically speaking,
may often be the more important element of the overall
message sought to be communicated.96
In summary, allowing Dan Frazier to continue to include the names of
Brandon Michael Read and other deceased soldiers on his provocative antiwar t-shirts and, in turn, to receive First Amendment protection akin to
that extended to Larry Flynt in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell reflects sound
First Amendment theory and policy. If the United States Supreme Court's
forty-four-year-old pronouncement that there is a "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open" 97 is to take on renewed and reinvigorated meaning
93.

438 U.S. 726 (1978).

94.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (quoting FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978)).
95.
See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.").
96.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
97.
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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in 2008, then Dan Frazier's striking statement of political protest merits
constitutional protection. Although the plaintiffs in the case may be private
figures, the message that they wish to change-wish to censor, to put it
more bluntly-with their lawsuit cuts deep to the core of political expression.
III.

A FIRST AMENDMENT VICTORY IN THE OFFING: WHY THE
READS SHOULD LOSE THEIR IED CLAIM

If the courts considering the Reads' IED claim against Dan Frazier
choose to extend to him, as this article has argued and contended in Part II
that they should, the same constitutional protection granted to Larry Flynt
in Falwell, then Frazier should be able to successfully defend the lawsuit
filed against him. Why? The reason is simple: The antiwar t-shirts make no
false assertions of fact about the plaintiffs or anyone else. Instead, the tshirts make a general statement of political opinion not directed at any individual at all, but rather targeting a government policy.
The rule created by the Supreme Court in Falwell holds that speechbased claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress brought by public figures and public officials cannot succeed without proof, in addition to
the basic elements of the lHED tort, "that the publication contains a false
statement offact which was made with 'actual malice,' i.e., with knowledge
that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not
it was true." 98 The subsidiary message conveyed by Frazier's t-shirts makes
no false statements of fact about anyone. It is a true fact that "They Died"-that the soldiers named on the t-shirts are deceased. Brandon Michael Read
is dead; that much is not disputed by the plaintiffs in their complaint. 99
More importantly, the primary message conveyed by the totality of the
writings on the t-shirts ("Bush Lied" + "They Died" + Names of Deceased
Soldiers) is simply an expression of an opinion about the war in Iraq. In
granting Frazier a preliminary injunction stopping enforcement of Arizona's criminal statute targeting the use of the names of deceased soldiers,
U.S. District Court Judge Neil V. Wake specifically called the message on
Frazier's t-shirt "a political opinion. ' 1°° It is not, in other words, a factual
assertion.
But let's assume, for the sake of argument, that it is not this political
opinion to which the Reads object. In particular, it is important to recall that
98.
Falwell,485 U.S. at 56 (emphasis added).
See Complaint, supra note 4, at 1 ("Brandon Michael Read died intestate on
99.
September 6, 2004, as a result of an lED explosion, which he encountered while in the service of his country as a member of the United States Armed Forces in Iraq.").
100. Frazier v. Boomsma, No. CV 07-08040-PHX-NVW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72427, at *51 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2007).
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it is the continued use of a name on a t-shirt that conveys a factually accurate assertion about that name (the assertion that Brandon Michael Read
died) to which the Reads object.1l0 If Falwell's protection applies to Dan
Frazier, then the lawsuit fails because, in a nutshell, the Reads failed to
plead any false fact to which they object. The t-shirts convey, instead, a
factually accurate message that Brandon Michael Read is dead, as well as a
political opinion about the war in Iraq.
Assuming, arguendo, that courts hearing the Reads' case fail to extend
the Falwell First Amendment safeguard to Dan Frazier on the grounds that
Falwell was limited to lawsuits brought by public officials and public figures, then Dan Frazier would still likely prevail in defending the case.
Why? Because the political nature of the speech in which the name of the
late son of the plaintiffs is embedded, when coupled with the passive manner in which it is conveyed-on a t-shirt without the use of any epithets or
lewd words-allows the First Amendment interests to trump both the alleged outrageousness of such speech and any severe emotional pain experienced by the plaintiffs that result from it. This is aptly illustrated by another
recent case of intentional infliction of emotional distress stemming from the
war in Iraq.
In Citizen Publishing Co. v. Miller,10 2 the Supreme Court of Arizona,
in July 2005, rejected an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
brought by and on behalf of members of the Muslim community in Tucson
against a newspaper. 103 The case focused on the publication by the newspaper of a letter to the editor from a reader that stated, in relevant part: "We
can stop the murder of American soldiers in Iraq by those who seek revenge
or to regain their power. Whenever there is an assassination or another
atrocity we should proceed to the closest mosque and execute five of the
first Muslims we encounter. '' 1°4 The trial court refused to dismiss the lIED
cause of action filed by the plaintiffs, holding that reasonable minds could
find that the publication of the letter constituted extreme and outrageous
conduct. 10 5 It will be recalled, from Part II of this article, that a finding of
extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant is a basic,
common-law element of the IIED tort.1 6

101.
Complaint, supra note 4, at 6.
115 P.3d 107 (Ariz. 2005).
102.
103.
The plaintiffs, Elleithee and Wali Yudeen S. Abdul Rahim, filed suit on behalf
of "all Islamic-Americans who live in the area covered by the circulation of the Tucson
Citizen, including the reach of the Internet website published by the Tucson Citizen." Id. at
109.
104.
Id.
105.
Id.
106.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court assumed, for the sake of argument, that the plaintiffs had stated, under Arizona law, a valid cause of action for IED. 107 Indeed, the court even called the letter "an outrageous
statement." 10 8 But the Arizona high court then began to weigh the First
Amendment protection of free speech against the IED claim, reasoning, in
a pivotal statement, that "[w]hen speech is about a matter of public concern,
state tort law alone cannot place the speech outside the protection of the
First Amendment." 1°9 Citing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Falwell,
the Arizona Supreme Court opined that individuals "seeking to impose liability for speech about matters of public concern-so-called 'political
speech'-must
establish some 'exception to... general First Amendment
10
principles.""
After determining that "the letter to the editor upon which plaintiffs'
complaint [wals based involve[d] a matter of undeniable public concernthe war in Iraq,"' 11 and recognizing what it called "the general rule of First
Amendment protection of political speech,"' 12 the Arizona high court then
found that the letter's contents did not fit within any one of the following
13
three exceptions to the First Amendment
protection of speech:
14
violence"
to
" Incitement
1 15
Fighting words
"

107.
Citizen Publ'g Co., 115 P.3d at 110.
108.
Id. at 113.
109.
Id. at 111.
110. Id. (quoting Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
111.
Id. at 111-12.
112.
ld. at 112.
113.
As Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the United States Supreme Court in
2002 in striking down a federal law prohibiting virtual child pornography, "[t]he freedom of
speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation,
incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children." Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002).
114. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the government can prohibit advocacy of force or illegal action only "where such advocacy is directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action"). See generally PEMBER & CALvERT, supra note 55, at 57 (discussing the Brandenburg
test and describing it as the modern-day version of the clear and present danger standard).
115.
The United States Supreme Court wrote more than sixty-five years ago in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), that:
[1]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all
times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or 'fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
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• True threats" 6
The Arizona Supreme Court wrote that "we conclude that this letter
does not fall within one of the well-recognized narrow exceptions to the
general rule of First Amendment protection for political speech. It follows,
therefore, that the Citizen cannot be held liable under Arizona tort law for
publishing this letter."' 17 This reasoning, if applied by the federal courts in
Tennessee that will hear the Reads' lawsuit, clearly supports a result favorable to Dan Frazier. As described below, the factual parallels and similarities between the cases easily justify such an application19 of the logic in Citi8
zen PublishingCo. v. Miller" to Read v. Lifeweaver.
First, the subject matter of the speech at issue is the same in both
cases. Just as the Arizona Supreme Court held that the speech in question in
Citizen Publishing Co. was about "a central political issue of the day: the
conduct of the war in Iraq," 120 so too did Judge Neil V. Wake conclude, in
enjoining Arizona's criminal statute targeting the unauthorized use of the
names of dead soldiers, that the t-shirt-based speech of Dan Frazier centers
on "the war in Iraq, perhaps the most salient and hotly debated issue in cur'1 21
rent American politics."
Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court later refined this definition of fighting
words to be "those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction."
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971).
116.
The United States Supreme Court first held that true threats were not protected
by the First Amendment in Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). True threats were
later defined by the nation's High Court in 2003 as "those statements where the speaker
means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343,
359 (2003). The Court noted at the time that "[i]ntimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or
group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death." Id. at
360.
Despite such efforts to define true threats, First Amendment scholar David Hudson asserts that "[t]rue-threat jurisprudence remains a muddled mess. Courts often have
trouble determining whether violent expression should be evaluated under the 'incitement to
imminent lawless action' standard or under a true-threats line of analysis." David L. Hudson,
Jr., Personal & Public Expression: True Threats, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR.,
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/Speech/personal/topic.aspx?topic=true-threats
(last
visited May 29, 2008). Hudson adds that "[lower courts are far from consistent in how they
determine whether speech is truly threatening. Some courts interpret Supreme Court case
law to require subjective intent, while others apply different versions of an 'objective' test as
some form of general intent to communicate." Id.
117.
Citizen Publ'g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 115 (Ariz. 2005).
118.
115 P.3d 107 (Ariz. 2005).
119.
Complaint, supra note 4.
120.
115 P.3d at 115.
121.
Frazier v. Boomsma, No. CV 07-08040-PHX-NVW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
72427, *33 (D. Ariz. Sept. 27, 2007).
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Second, the speech at issue in both cases represents a printed and passive form of expression: a letter to the editor printed in a newspaper in CitiCo.,122 a t-shirt emblazoned with printed words and names
zen Publishing
123
in Read.
Third, both cases involve causes of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
Fourth and finally, just as the Arizona Supreme Court found that the
letter to the editor at issue in Citizen Publishing Co. did not constitute an
incitement to violence, fighting words, or a true threat, there is no indication that the t-shirts to which the Reads object fall into any one of these
categories of unprotected expression. 124 For instance, in reasoning that the
letter to the editor in Citizen Publishing Co. did not amount to an unprotected incitement to violence, the Arizona Supreme Court wrote:
Nor vere the words likely to produce imminent lawless action. The statement was made in a letter to the editor, not
before an angry mob. Indeed, the complaint was filed more
than a month after the challenged statements were made
and did not allege that a single act of violence had ensued
publication nor that such violence was immifrom the
125
nent.
Similarly, the speech of Dan Frazier was not made before an angry
mob and, in fact, the Reads' complaint against Frazier was filed in April
2008, more than six months after the complaint acknowledged that Robin
Read first learned of the t-shirts in September 2007.126 What is more, the
Reads' complaint does not allege a single instance of violence that
127 has resuited from the sale or wearing of the t-shirts sold by Dan Frazier.
In addition, in deciding that the letter to the editor in Citizen Publishing Co. did not constitute unprotected fighting words, the Arizona Supreme
Court wrote:
This case does not fall within the fighting words exception
to the First Amendment. The statements at issue were made
in a letter to the editor, not in a face-to-face confrontation
122.
115 P.3d at 109.
123.
Complaint, supra note 4.
115 P.3d at 115.
124.
Id. at 113.
125.
126.
See Complaint, supra note 4, at 2 (providing that "[i]n September 2007, plaintiff, Robin Read, learned that the defendants, jointly and severally, were selling, for profit,
'anti war t-shirts' with the names of all of the thousands of American service members killed
in Iraq").
127.
Complaint, supra note 4, at 2.
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with the target of the remarks. While the letter expresses
controversial ideas, it contains no personally abusive words
or epithets. The letter is neither directed toward any particular individual nor likely to provoke
a violent reaction
128
by the reader against the speaker.
All of this, of course, holds equally true for Dan Frazier's t-shirts. The
printed speech carried on them is directed at no one in particular (there is
not, in other words, a face-to-face confrontation) and the shirts contain no
personally abusive words or epithets (they only include names and the
words "Bush Lied" and "They Died"). The t-shirts simply do not constitute
an instance of fighting words.
In summary, the Reads' cause of action for intentional infliction of
emotional distress should fail under both the protection provided by the
Supreme
Court inCourt
Falwell129
and Publishing
the logic and
reasoning adopted by the
Arizona Supreme
in Citizen
Co.130
IV.

CONCLUSION

The war in Iraq clearly evokes heated emotions, and Dan Frazier certainly pressed down hard on the red-hot emotional buttons of Robin and
Michael Read by using the name of their dead son on antiwar t-shirts despite their request that he remove it. Although their grief may be genuine
and would only be doubted by a cynic, this article has argued that the
Reads' cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress eventually must be rejected on First Amendment grounds. As the United States
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in 2007, political131
speech is "at the core
protect."
to
designed
is
Amendment
First
of what the
The Reads, however, are not remediless. They are free to fight it out,
verbal blow for verbal blow, with Dan Frazier by engaging in their own
speech that honors their son. In particular, they can create t-shirts with messages such as "They Died As Heroes" or "Honor Our American Heroes"
emblazoned on top of the names of soldiers killed in Iraq. Such counterspeech132 would not only provide the Reads with a cathartic outlet for their
emotional grief, but also contribute to the political debate on the war.
Of course, the debate between the Reads and Dan Frazier need not be
limited to simplistic sloganeering on t-shirts. Importantly, it is worth noting
128.
Citizen Publ'g Co., 115 P.3d at 113-14.
129.
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988).
130.
115 P.3d at 113-14.
131.
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) (quoting Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003)).
132.
See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (discussing counterspeech).
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here that Larry Flynt and Jerry Falwell, after the Supreme Court resolved
their contentious litigation centering on an HED claim, went on to debate
each other at venues throughout the country. 133 As Flynt wrote in a commentary published in the Los Angeles Times shortly after Falwell's death in
2007:
I was in my office in Beverly Hills, and out of nowhere my
secretary buzzes me, saying, "Jerry Falwell is here to see
you." I was shocked, but I said, "Send him in." We talked
for two hours, with the latest issues of Hustler neatly
stacked on my desk in front of him. He suggested that we
go around the country debating, and I agreed. We went to
iscolleges, debating moral issues and 1st Amendment
34
sues-what is "proper," what's not and why.'
The debates between the counterposed litigants of Flynt and Falwell
represented a great illustration of counterspeech and the type of debate essential for a democratic society. One can envision similar debates between
Frazier and the Reads, bringing their controversy to the American public
rather than to the judicial system.
Ultimately, no amount of money can ever compensate a family for the
loss of a child. Honoring traditions of free speech that tolerate dissenting
political expression, instead, would perhaps be a fitting way for the Reads
to pay tribute to their lost son. As the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit opined in May 2008, the First Amendment guarantee of political speech "is the essential freedom that defines our ability-both individually and collectively-to speak in unfettered fashion on the most pressing issues of the day, and to express approval or disapproval of the functioning of our representative government." 135 Frazier, with his t-shirts, is
simply expressing his disapproval of the functioning of the government in
carrying out the war in Iraq. And while an outcome in court in favor of Dan
Frazier may leave the Reads without monetary compensation, such a result
embodies the United States Supreme Court's statement in 2007 that "the
First Amendment requires 'us
to err on the side of protecting political speech
' 36
it.
suppressing
than
rather

133.
See, e.g., Carlos Santos, Flynt, Falwell Square Off; Pornographerand Preacher
Debate Freedoms, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH (Va.), Nov. 2, 1997, at C-I (describing a
debate between Falwell and Flynt at the University of Virginia).
134.
Flynt, supra note 50, at MI.
135.
N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 296 (4th Cir. 2008).
136.
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